The Next Boom Will Come

The global economy is in the doldrums. Collapsing housing prices and ensuing foreclosures have brought both borrowers and lenders to their knees, frozen credit markets, depressed stock prices, softened consumer demand, forced oil, metal (even gold) and other commodity prices lower, and now dragged down the commercial real estate market as well. The Bush and Paulson $700 billion financial rescue plan has morphed from an impracticable illiquid-asset buyback plan to shore up bank balance sheets into an across-the-board equity infusion scheme and sadly, along its porky way, lost focus, impact and credibility. Cynics question what benefit Bernanke's many years of academic study of the Great Depression have brought him, or anyone else, for that matter. Respected business figures (for example, Soros and Dimon) warn of a deepening recession in 2009, possibly even a depression.

Given the dour outlook of economic experts and pervasive pessimism of the investing public, it's hard to be optimistic--but I am. I'm confident that better times and a stronger economy lie ahead of us. Really, a brighter future is all but inevitable. Yes, I repeat, just as day follows night, we will see better times. Let me explain the root of my optimism.

Generally speaking, two basic schools of economic thought have been most influential over the past 75 years--Keynesians (including neo-Keynesians), who advocate fiscal measures such as an increase in government spending to stimulate a sluggish economy, and higher taxes to cool an overheated inflationary economy; and monetarists (led by Friedman's Chicago school), who believe that what's more important is controlling the money supply, primarily through buying and selling government bonds in the open market and raising and lowering the discount rate. Both schools of economic thought unabashedly lay claim to real-world successes of their models--Keynesians take credit for lifting the economy back onto its feet through FDR's New Deal spending following the Great Depression in the 1930s, and monetarists boast of steady and prolonged economic growth in the 1980s (Reagan years) and 1990s--despite the many recessions we have seen, including those in recent decades: 1980 (7 months), 1981-1982 (17 months), 1991-1992 (8 months), 2001-2002 (12 months), and presumably 2008-2009.

While these two mainstream schools of economic thought certainly have their differences, they also share an important commonality--both rely heavily on government intervention to control or at least influence economic growth. President Bush's consumer-targeted economic stimulus package during the early days of the current financial crisis and the new stimulus package that President-elect Obama stressed as a high-priority item in his first press conference a week ago are examples of Keynesian policy in action. The Fed's continual "busy-body" adjustment of the discount rate--Greenspan's lowering of the rate to 1% in 2003 during the last recession precipitated by the dot-com bubble, and raising it back up to the 5% range by the time of his retirement in 2006, and Bernanke's pushing the discount rate all the way back down again to 1% last month, while hinting at more rate cuts to follow--are examples of attempts to steer the economy using monetary policy.

In sharp contrast to these two mainstream schools are those who argue that both the Keynesians and monetarists are wrong-headed. For example, the Austrian school, based on the thinking of Mises and Hayek, explain how government intervention is not the solution. Stating that fiscal and monetary policy fail to produce their intended impact, these economists insist that, instead of smoothing the vagaries of the business cycle, government intervention actually causes the booms and busts, through over-extension and over-contraction of credit at artificial prices via the highly government-regulated fractional-reserve banking system. Quite contrary to active intervention, the Austrian school recommends following a laissez-faire "do nothing" approach, theorizing that this is the only way to cure permanently our economic woes. For a coherent exposition of the Austrian school's position, see Murray Rothbard's 1969 essay, "Economic Depressions: Their Cause and Cure," here.

Which economic school is right? Well, first off, practically speaking, it would be grossly out of character and, in fact, outright political suicide for any president--whether lame-duck Bush, or our country's new icon of hope, "renegade" Obama--to tell us American citizens that, after serious dialog and lengthy reflection, the elected officials and their appointed experts have decided that a "do nothing" policy is best. With home foreclosures at historical highs and rising, and growing worries over burdensome credit card balances, auto loans and other consumer debt, the popular approval ratings of even the most charismatic of political leaders would undoubtedly suffer greatly if all their economic advisory team could come up with is to a "do nothing" strategy for tackling the current economic crisis. No, simply put, Americans are by nature more active doers than thinkers, and doing nothing never has been and probably never will be an acceptable alternative for managing our economy.

So, much to the chagrin of Austrian school economists, we must conclude that government intervention, whether effective or not, will continue when Obama and later presidents take office. Given this inevitability that politicians and their mainstream economic advisers will always be inclined to fiddle with the economy, here's the logic of what to expect:
  • If the sketchy long-run track record (performing like a "B" student, with 13 out of the 115 quarters beginning in 1980 showing negative real GDP growth, according to BEA data) of the Keynesians and monetarists is any indication, we should see at least some degree of over-shooting in the future, perhaps this time manifested by a delayed but sudden response of our economy to excessive fiscal stimulus or overly loose monetary policy, resulting in either consumer price inflation or yet another asset bubble. (On the other hand, if by chance (or fluke?) policymakers have learned from the last boom-bust cycle and this time around manage to get the economic fine-tuning exactly right, they will have realized the heroic feat of taming the recalcitrant business cycle, macroeconomic volatility will cease, and we will all live, at least economically, happily ever after. . . . but I would tend to believe other fairy tales before placing undue faith in this one, wouldn't you?)
  • If the Austrian school is correct in their critical analysis of the shortcomings of Keynesian and monetary policy, the current credit-driven bust will inevitably be followed by a boom, and the more our government intervenes to try to fix the problem, the higher the crest and deeper the trough we will see during the next boom-bust cycle.
In other words, however we dissect our economic situation, the business cycle remains alive and well. Both empirically and theoretically, we can be sure that economic booms and busts will continue. Admittedly, the precise timing is anyone's guess but, following the current, painful de-leveraging and retrenchment of credit in our financial system, at some point in the future, credit creation will again be in vogue, creating over-expansion of credit in some asset class, and soon enough spilling over into other asset classes. Yes, however unlikely it may now appear to be (case in point: was anyone predicting a collapse in oil prices to today's $58 per barrel when it soared above $140 as recently as July?), one day we will experience yet another bubble. Seeing how the collective memory of market participants tends to be selective and short, I wouldn't be surprised if such a rebound happens earlier and quicker than any respected market commentator would now dare to predict.

Suffice it to say, for anyone distraught by the current bust, please have patience: the next boom will come--maybe even sooner than you or anyone now thinks.

The Next Boom Will Come

The global economy is in the doldrums. Collapsing housing prices and ensuing foreclosures have brought both borrowers and lenders to their knees, frozen credit markets, depressed stock prices, softened consumer demand, forced oil, metal (even gold) and other commodity prices lower, and now dragged down the commercial real estate market as well. The Bush and Paulson $700 billion financial rescue plan has morphed from an impracticable illiquid-asset buyback plan to shore up bank balance sheets into an across-the-board equity infusion scheme and sadly, along its porky way, lost focus, impact and credibility. Cynics question what benefit Bernanke's many years of academic study of the Great Depression have brought him, or anyone else, for that matter. Respected business figures (for example, Soros and Dimon) warn of a deepening recession in 2009, possibly even a depression.

Given the dour outlook of economic experts and pervasive pessimism of the investing public, it's hard to be optimistic--but I am. I'm confident that better times and a stronger economy lie ahead of us. Really, a brighter future is all but inevitable. Yes, I repeat, just as day follows night, we will see better times. Let me explain the root of my optimism.

Generally speaking, two basic schools of economic thought have been most influential over the past 75 years--Keynesians (including neo-Keynesians), who advocate fiscal measures such as an increase in government spending to stimulate a sluggish economy, and higher taxes to cool an overheated inflationary economy; and monetarists (led by Friedman's Chicago school), who believe that what's more important is controlling the money supply, primarily through buying and selling government bonds in the open market and raising and lowering the discount rate. Both schools of economic thought unabashedly lay claim to real-world successes of their models--Keynesians take credit for lifting the economy back onto its feet through FDR's New Deal spending following the Great Depression in the 1930s, and monetarists boast of steady and prolonged economic growth in the 1980s (Reagan years) and 1990s--despite the many recessions we have seen, including those in recent decades: 1980 (7 months), 1981-1982 (17 months), 1991-1992 (8 months), 2001-2002 (12 months), and presumably 2008-2009.

While these two mainstream schools of economic thought certainly have their differences, they also share an important commonality--both rely heavily on government intervention to control or at least influence economic growth. President Bush's consumer-targeted economic stimulus package during the early days of the current financial crisis and the new stimulus package that President-elect Obama stressed as a high-priority item in his first press conference a week ago are examples of Keynesian policy in action. The Fed's continual "busy-body" adjustment of the discount rate--Greenspan's lowering of the rate to 1% in 2003 during the last recession precipitated by the dot-com bubble, and raising it back up to the 5% range by the time of his retirement in 2006, and Bernanke's pushing the discount rate all the way back down again to 1% last month, while hinting at more rate cuts to follow--are examples of attempts to steer the economy using monetary policy.

In sharp contrast to these two mainstream schools are those who argue that both the Keynesians and monetarists are wrong-headed. For example, the Austrian school, based on the thinking of Mises and Hayek, explain how government intervention is not the solution. Stating that fiscal and monetary policy fail to produce their intended impact, these economists insist that, instead of smoothing the vagaries of the business cycle, government intervention actually causes the booms and busts, through over-extension and over-contraction of credit at artificial prices via the highly government-regulated fractional-reserve banking system. Quite contrary to active intervention, the Austrian school recommends following a laissez-faire "do nothing" approach, theorizing that this is the only way to cure permanently our economic woes. For a coherent exposition of the Austrian school's position, see Murray Rothbard's 1969 essay, "Economic Depressions: Their Cause and Cure," here.

Which economic school is right? Well, first off, practically speaking, it would be grossly out of character and, in fact, outright political suicide for any president--whether lame-duck Bush, or our country's new icon of hope, "renegade" Obama--to tell us American citizens that, after serious dialog and lengthy reflection, the elected officials and their appointed experts have decided that a "do nothing" policy is best. With home foreclosures at historical highs and rising, and growing worries over burdensome credit card balances, auto loans and other consumer debt, the popular approval ratings of even the most charismatic of political leaders would undoubtedly suffer greatly if all their economic advisory team could come up with is to a "do nothing" strategy for tackling the current economic crisis. No, simply put, Americans are by nature more active doers than thinkers, and doing nothing never has been and probably never will be an acceptable alternative for managing our economy.

So, much to the chagrin of Austrian school economists, we must conclude that government intervention, whether effective or not, will continue when Obama and later presidents take office. Given this inevitability that politicians and their mainstream economic advisers will always be inclined to fiddle with the economy, here's the logic of what to expect:
  • If the sketchy long-run track record (performing like a "B" student, with 13 out of the 115 quarters beginning in 1980 showing negative real GDP growth, according to BEA data) of the Keynesians and monetarists is any indication, we should see at least some degree of over-shooting in the future, perhaps this time manifested by a delayed but sudden response of our economy to excessive fiscal stimulus or overly loose monetary policy, resulting in either consumer price inflation or yet another asset bubble. (On the other hand, if by chance (or fluke?) policymakers have learned from the last boom-bust cycle and this time around manage to get the economic fine-tuning exactly right, they will have realized the heroic feat of taming the recalcitrant business cycle, macroeconomic volatility will cease, and we will all live, at least economically, happily ever after. . . . but I would tend to believe other fairy tales before placing undue faith in this one, wouldn't you?)
  • If the Austrian school is correct in their critical analysis of the shortcomings of Keynesian and monetary policy, the current credit-driven bust will inevitably be followed by a boom, and the more our government intervenes to try to fix the problem, the higher the crest and deeper the trough we will see during the next boom-bust cycle.
In other words, however we dissect our economic situation, the business cycle remains alive and well. Both empirically and theoretically, we can be sure that economic booms and busts will continue. Admittedly, the precise timing is anyone's guess but, following the current, painful de-leveraging and retrenchment of credit in our financial system, at some point in the future, credit creation will again be in vogue, creating over-expansion of credit in some asset class, and soon enough spilling over into other asset classes. Yes, however unlikely it may now appear to be (case in point: was anyone predicting a collapse in oil prices to today's $58 per barrel when it soared above $140 as recently as July?), one day we will experience yet another bubble. Seeing how the collective memory of market participants tends to be selective and short, I wouldn't be surprised if such a rebound happens earlier and quicker than any respected market commentator would now dare to predict.

Suffice it to say, for anyone distraught by the current bust, please have patience: the next boom will come--maybe even sooner than you or anyone now thinks.

Augusta – Focus on Advancing Copper Rich Deposit in Arizona

Augusta Resources (AZC) is primarily focused on the Rosemont Copper deposit near Tucson, Arizona, one of the largest copper mines currently in development in the North America. Augusta is headquartered in Denver, Colorado, and their Rosemont property is 50 km southeast of Tucson, conveniently located for mining operations via highway, a network of unpaved roads, and proximity from major transmission line and main rail lines to key ports. Their President & CEO, Mr. Gil Clausen, was in New York City on October 29th to discuss their strategy and growth potential of their resources.

In the past week or so, Augusta has two important announcements. They first announced on October 31st that a silver off-take financing arrangement with Silver Wheaton is to be re-structured upon completion of the Updated bankable feasibility study which is expected to be complete by yearend. My expectation is that the term will be likely more favorable than the previous agreement elected back in April, 2008, due to higher resource estimates and thus better economic value. Then this Monday (Nov 3rd), they announced that they have received significant strategic interest regarding their 100% owned Rosemont Copper/Moly project.

The Rosemont Copper project for Augusta is a very large low cost open-pit copper deposit. The total resources (M&I and Inferred) are estimated to be 7.7 billion lbs of copper, 190 million lbs of moly and 80 million ounces of silver, which turns into about 11 billion lbs of copper equivalent. The cost estimate is expected to be in the neighborhood of $0.5 per lb of copper, net of by-product credits (the net by-product credit is calculated based on very conservative long term $12 moly and $8 silver). Even without including the by-product credit, the cash cost is still only $0.9 per lb of copper. With today’s depressed commodity prices across the board, there is still a good profit margin due to its high grade and low cost. This puts Augusta well below other median and marginal cost producers and give them a large competitive advantage. Strategically, the major U.S. copper producer Freeport-McMoRan is also operating near Augusta’s property, and this location, the low-risk jurisdiction and its copper/moly rich mines make Augusta well situated for future options.

The production is expected to start in the 2nd half of 2011, assuming permitting and construction on schedule, with average annual planned production of about 230 million lbs of copper, 5 million lbs of moly and over 3 million ounces of silver which ties to the silver-backed financing deal with Silver Wheaton mentioned above. This level of output will account for 10% of US copper output once in production, and propel Augusta to become a solid mid-tier copper producer, probably the 3rd largest in the US.

The capital expenditure of their Rosemont project costs about $800 million total, with 40% of the capital committed under fixed price contracts. According to the last bankable feasibility study (BFS) back in 2007, which will be updated by yearend, with conservative assumptions on commodity prices for the whole life of this mine: $1.5 for copper, $15 for moly, and $10 for silver, and with a discount rate at 10%, the net present value (NPV) is still around $460 million, more than 4 times higher than the current Augusta’s market cap of $96 million. The payback period is also impressive with less than 3 years. The upcoming BFS is likely to be more favorable due to increased level of resources.

Even with the recent reduced forecast of copper demand, the copper mine supply still falls short for foreseeable future years. No doubt that the current slump in commodities has depressed the stock prices of many developmental mining firms like Augusta. But financially Augusta is strong, and had $15 million cash at the last Q2 report. The previous April Silver Wheaton deal has satisfied about 20% of total capital requirements for the Rosemont project by only sacrificing 2% of the total future project revenue. Then on June 17 this year, Augusta has secured another $40 million loan with Sumitomo. Both deals have minimized equity dilution for existing shareholders. What might happen in the near future, maybe Q1 next year when an updated BFS is available, it is very typical for a junior to sell partial interest in its project to a major in exchange for financing to continue the construction of their mining operations. The latest press release indicates the possibility of such joint venture potential.

More importantly, if we believe the recent copper price was oversold and has reached the bottom, and will stay above $2 on average for many years into the future, the operating leverage provided by Augusta will substantially increase the value of its Rosemont project. It won’t surprise me that Augusta would triple or even quadruple from the current $1 price level to somewhere in the $3-4 range, which only brings them back to the price level this time last year.

Disclosure: I don’t own Augusta Resources, but I believe AZC is currently undervalued and provides a good opportunity for a diversified mining portfolio for long term capital gain.

Thomas Tan, CFA, MBA
Thomast2@optonline.net

Disclaimer: The contents of this article represent the opinion and analysis of Thomas Tan, who cannot accept responsibility for any trading losses you may incur as a result of your reliance on this opinion and analysis and will not be held liable for the consequence of reliance upon any opinion or statement contained herein or any omission. Individuals should consult with their broker and personal financial advisors before engaging in any trading activities. Do your own due diligence regarding personal investment decisions.

Older Bulls Wiser than Younger Bears? Maybe

Old bulls versus younger bears. This could be entirely coincidental. Has anyone noticed that bullish sentiment seems correlated with age?

Bullish and Buying

The most prominent U.S. stock market bull to surface in recent days is highly respected Mr. Buffett, who was born in 1930 and grew up during the Great Depression years. If as a child he was too young to comprehend the hard times and economic turmoil of the era, we can at least presume that, in his early adult years as a student of Ben Graham, Buffett absorbed the first-hand lessons garnered by his teacher, who had lost everything during the stock market crash of 1929, which apparently was the life-changing event that led Graham to formulate his well-known value-investing methodology. Quoting from Buffett's op-ed piece in the New York Times:

Warren Buffett (age 78): October 16, 2008. "Buy American. I am."
"The financial world is a mess, both in the United States and abroad. So . . . I’ve been buying American stocks. . . . I previously owned nothing but United States government bonds. If prices keep looking attractive, my non-Berkshire net worth will soon be 100 percent in United States equities."

Also notable is so-called "perma-bear" Grantham, whose switchover into the bullish camp can be considered significant, since he spent the past couple of decades marauding with the bears:

Jeremy Grantham
(age 69): October 18, 2008. "Silver Linings and Lessons Learned"
We "have moderately cheap U.S. and global equities for the first time in 20 years. . . . We at GMO [Grantham's investment management company] are already careful buyers. We are reconciled to buying too soon, but we recognize that our fair value estimate of 975 on the S&P 500 is, from historical precedent, likely to overrun on the downside by 20% to 40%, giving a range of 585 to 780 on the s&P as a probable low."

I am not sure how much weight Glickenhaus's opinion carries today in the investor community, but he is said to be the lone voice who boldly spoke out when stocks fell 23% on Black Monday in 1987, confidently calling a market bottom and the start of the next bull market. FOX Business has interviewed Glickenhaus twice during the past few weeks, highlighting the relevance of his experience of having lived through the stock market crash of 1929 and seen how the government's actions (or inaction) impacted the severity of the Great Depression:

Seth Glickenhaus (age 94): October 27, 2008. "On the Verge of a New Bull Market. . . "
"We are making a painful but meaningful low. . . . This is a rare opportunity to buy stocks at substantially below their intrinsic values. . . . We are on the verge of a new bull market beginning within a week or two. . . ."
(Note: On October 15, 2008, on Neil Cavuto's show on FOX Business, Glickenhaus indicated that a new bull market would start "next week." That day, the S&P 500 closed at 908. Today, a week and a half later, the S&P 500 closed at 849, a fresh, new five-and-a-half-year low.)

Bearish and Avoiding Stocks

As might be expected, so-called "Dr. Doom," Marc Faber, sees the U.S. and world mired in a serious recession that will last a few years. However, he also sees potential for a near-term rally within the longer-term bear market:

Marc Faber (age about 60?): October 20, 2008. "Stocks May Rally, Won't Reach Records"
"We're extremely oversold at the present time. The market is in a position to rebound." However, Faber holds only a small equity position: "stocks make up 7 or 8 percent of his holdings, with cash, bonds and gold, his biggest position, accounting for the rest." Also, his opinion on the U.S. economy remains gloomy: "To rebuild economic health in the United States, you need a serious recession that will last several years. The patient that got drunk on credit growth needs to go into rehabilitation. To give him more alcohol, the way the Fed and the Treasury propose to do, is the wrong medicine."

Next, here's the opinion of a firmly committed, unwavering bear, who is calling for a significantly lower bottom:

Gary Shilling (age in 60s): October 22, 2008. "We Haven't Seen the Worst Yet"
"The economy hasn't hit bottom yet. Neither, in all likelihood, have stocks. . . . If you're an equity investor with a long-only portfolio, it's not too late to take some money off the table. Remember 777--not the airliner but the low that the Standard & Poor's 500 hit in 2002. That's 21% beneath where we are today, but if it's breached, then all the stock rise of the last six years will have been but a bear market rally, and the bear market that started in March 2000 will still be with us."

Finally, representative of the diversity of opinion, here's a market commentator who is one of the few courageous enough to state publicly that Buffett is, whether we like it or not, just plain wrong this time around:

Diane Francis (age in 40s): October 27, 2008. "Buffett Is Wrong: Avoid Stocks"
"Far be it from me to contradict one of the world's greatest stock sages and business analysts. But I will. Seems to me that we are in uncharted territory with this panic until the U.S. election is staged on November 4 and until the global community demonstrates that it is going to appoint sheriffs to patrol the global economy and stop the kind of jurisdictional arbitrage that led to the casino-ization of banking. . . . For me, buying and selling should not be an option at least until the U.S. election and probably until January 2009."

Does Age Matter?

Admittedly, based on a sample size of just three opinions from each camp, we have at hand little more than anecdotal evidence and, consequently, cannot draw any conclusion that comes even close to being statistically significant. However, with the bull opinions coming from investors in approximately the 70-to-90 age group, versus the bear opinions from a younger cohort in the 40-to-60 age group, I suspect that investor age might be an indicator of stock market sentiment.

One interpretation is that the older generation, having closer first-hand experience with the crash of 1929 and economic hard times during the 1930s, have a deeper appreciation for today's unprecedented government efforts to stem the current financial crisis before it reaches depression-era proportions. If the bulls end up being correct, we will in a few years' time look back upon today and have to acknowledge that the older seers professed a certain "market wisdom" that the less experienced, younger generation lacked. On the other hand, if the bears win the battle and the actual market bottom turns out to be much lower, I can already almost hear the youthful crowd "writing off" the elderly bulls as having "gone senile," being "out to pasture," or at least being "out of touch" with these ever so "modern" times of ours.

For the sake of global economic stability, I certainly hope the old bulls really are the wiser. However, on days like today, with the market closing at a new low, we have to fear that the younger bears could be right in the short run.

Older Bulls Wiser than Younger Bears? Maybe

Old bulls versus younger bears. This could be entirely coincidental. Has anyone noticed that bullish sentiment seems correlated with age?

Bullish and Buying

The most prominent U.S. stock market bull to surface in recent days is highly respected Mr. Buffett, who was born in 1930 and grew up during the Great Depression years. If as a child he was too young to comprehend the hard times and economic turmoil of the era, we can at least presume that, in his early adult years as a student of Ben Graham, Buffett absorbed the first-hand lessons garnered by his teacher, who had lost everything during the stock market crash of 1929, which apparently was the life-changing event that led Graham to formulate his well-known value-investing methodology. Quoting from Buffett's op-ed piece in the New York Times:

Warren Buffett (age 78): October 16, 2008. "Buy American. I am."
"The financial world is a mess, both in the United States and abroad. So . . . I’ve been buying American stocks. . . . I previously owned nothing but United States government bonds. If prices keep looking attractive, my non-Berkshire net worth will soon be 100 percent in United States equities."

Also notable is so-called "perma-bear" Grantham, whose switchover into the bullish camp can be considered significant, since he spent the past couple of decades marauding with the bears:

Jeremy Grantham
(age 69): October 18, 2008. "Silver Linings and Lessons Learned"
We "have moderately cheap U.S. and global equities for the first time in 20 years. . . . We at GMO [Grantham's investment management company] are already careful buyers. We are reconciled to buying too soon, but we recognize that our fair value estimate of 975 on the S&P 500 is, from historical precedent, likely to overrun on the downside by 20% to 40%, giving a range of 585 to 780 on the s&P as a probable low."

I am not sure how much weight Glickenhaus's opinion carries today in the investor community, but he is said to be the lone voice who boldly spoke out when stocks fell 23% on Black Monday in 1987, confidently calling a market bottom and the start of the next bull market. FOX Business has interviewed Glickenhaus twice during the past few weeks, highlighting the relevance of his experience of having lived through the stock market crash of 1929 and seen how the government's actions (or inaction) impacted the severity of the Great Depression:

Seth Glickenhaus (age 94): October 27, 2008. "On the Verge of a New Bull Market. . . "
"We are making a painful but meaningful low. . . . This is a rare opportunity to buy stocks at substantially below their intrinsic values. . . . We are on the verge of a new bull market beginning within a week or two. . . ."
(Note: On October 15, 2008, on Neil Cavuto's show on FOX Business, Glickenhaus indicated that a new bull market would start "next week." That day, the S&P 500 closed at 908. Today, a week and a half later, the S&P 500 closed at 849, a fresh, new five-and-a-half-year low.)

Bearish and Avoiding Stocks

As might be expected, so-called "Dr. Doom," Marc Faber, sees the U.S. and world mired in a serious recession that will last a few years. However, he also sees potential for a near-term rally within the longer-term bear market:

Marc Faber (age about 60?): October 20, 2008. "Stocks May Rally, Won't Reach Records"
"We're extremely oversold at the present time. The market is in a position to rebound." However, Faber holds only a small equity position: "stocks make up 7 or 8 percent of his holdings, with cash, bonds and gold, his biggest position, accounting for the rest." Also, his opinion on the U.S. economy remains gloomy: "To rebuild economic health in the United States, you need a serious recession that will last several years. The patient that got drunk on credit growth needs to go into rehabilitation. To give him more alcohol, the way the Fed and the Treasury propose to do, is the wrong medicine."

Next, here's the opinion of a firmly committed, unwavering bear, who is calling for a significantly lower bottom:

Gary Shilling (age in 60s): October 22, 2008. "We Haven't Seen the Worst Yet"
"The economy hasn't hit bottom yet. Neither, in all likelihood, have stocks. . . . If you're an equity investor with a long-only portfolio, it's not too late to take some money off the table. Remember 777--not the airliner but the low that the Standard & Poor's 500 hit in 2002. That's 21% beneath where we are today, but if it's breached, then all the stock rise of the last six years will have been but a bear market rally, and the bear market that started in March 2000 will still be with us."

Finally, representative of the diversity of opinion, here's a market commentator who is one of the few courageous enough to state publicly that Buffett is, whether we like it or not, just plain wrong this time around:

Diane Francis (age in 40s): October 27, 2008. "Buffett Is Wrong: Avoid Stocks"
"Far be it from me to contradict one of the world's greatest stock sages and business analysts. But I will. Seems to me that we are in uncharted territory with this panic until the U.S. election is staged on November 4 and until the global community demonstrates that it is going to appoint sheriffs to patrol the global economy and stop the kind of jurisdictional arbitrage that led to the casino-ization of banking. . . . For me, buying and selling should not be an option at least until the U.S. election and probably until January 2009."

Does Age Matter?

Admittedly, based on a sample size of just three opinions from each camp, we have at hand little more than anecdotal evidence and, consequently, cannot draw any conclusion that comes even close to being statistically significant. However, with the bull opinions coming from investors in approximately the 70-to-90 age group, versus the bear opinions from a younger cohort in the 40-to-60 age group, I suspect that investor age might be an indicator of stock market sentiment.

One interpretation is that the older generation, having closer first-hand experience with the crash of 1929 and economic hard times during the 1930s, have a deeper appreciation for today's unprecedented government efforts to stem the current financial crisis before it reaches depression-era proportions. If the bulls end up being correct, we will in a few years' time look back upon today and have to acknowledge that the older seers professed a certain "market wisdom" that the less experienced, younger generation lacked. On the other hand, if the bears win the battle and the actual market bottom turns out to be much lower, I can already almost hear the youthful crowd "writing off" the elderly bulls as having "gone senile," being "out to pasture," or at least being "out of touch" with these ever so "modern" times of ours.

For the sake of global economic stability, I certainly hope the old bulls really are the wiser. However, on days like today, with the market closing at a new low, we have to fear that the younger bears could be right in the short run.

Potential secret weapon to battle our financial crisis: A trillion dollar debt-to-equity swap

While heavily indebted American consumers struggle to make mortgage and credit card payments, a larger shift is underway. News from Tokyo indicates that politicians in Japan, America's "friendly" creditor nation, are beginning to consider investing the country's massive horde of foreign reserves, to "take advantage of the opportunities opening up around the world" during this global financial crisis we are in.

The largest foreign exchange reserves are held by China with $1.9 trillion and Japan with $1.0 trillion, followed by Eurozone countries and Russia, each with about $550 billion. Almost all of these largely U.S. dollar-denominated reserves are invested in conservative fixed-income instruments like U.S. Treasury bonds. However, as noted already in a 2005 article by Andrew Rozonov, who first used the term "sovereign wealth fund," the practical distinction between foreign exchange reserves and their more equity-like sovereign wealth fund counterpart has begun to blur.

In the earlier part of the subprime crisis, we saw high-profile investing of $21 billion by sovereign wealth funds (Singapore, Kuwait and South Korea) into U.S. financial institutions (Citi and Merrill). This week's closing of Mitsubishi UFJ's $9 billion capital infusion into Morgan Stanley is a private sector version of the same type of foreign investment. Given the, not billion, but trillion dollar scale of the foreign exchange reserves that China and Japan have amassed, any decision on their part to swap even a small portion of their fixed-income funds into equity-like investments will have a tremendous impact on the U.S. equity market.

Ponder this: The investments last January by smaller sovereign wealth funds in U.S. financial institutions helped to boost capital, but nevertheless Merrill is now being acquired by Bank of America and Citi's balance sheet is still under pressure. The U.S. government coordinated JPMorgan's acquisition of faltering Bear Stearns in March, but that did not prevent Lehman from going bankrupt in September. After an unprecedented $85 billion government lifeline to AIG last month, AIG needed another $38 billion just last week. Also, despite heightened government intervention in recent weeks--Paulson's $700 billion bank rescue plan signed into law on October 3, coordinated global rate cuts by many G-7 members and other countries last week, and the government's "no objections allowed" infusion of $125 billion capital into JPMorgan, Bank of America, Citi, Wells Fargo, Goldman, Morgan Stanley and other financial institutions announced on Monday--the economic outlook grows bleaker, people worry more about their jobs and retirement and cut back on consumption, and the stock market resumes its downward spiral while real estate prices sag further.

In short, each and every policy measure to date, however unprecedented and seemingly "radical" at implementation, has failed to stem the economic bleeding.

So, where do we turn at this juncture? Well, recall the proverbial "rich uncle," who is perennially forthcoming with money gifts when you are a kid, lends you the extra money you need for a down payment when buying your first house, and provides half the capital you need to start a new business. As our financial crisis runs its course, we Americans as owners of over-leveraged assets in our increasingly distressed U.S. economy really have only one place to go for the capital we so badly need. Because there is not enough capital internally within our national borders, the much-needed equity capital to stabilize our economy and restore confidence of consumers and among financial institutions must come from abroad.

Like it or not, for equity capital rather than just debt, American financial institutions, large corporations and our U.S. equity markets as a whole need to tap into the trillions of dollars of foreign exchange reserves on the books of governments throughout the world, and particularly the trillion dollar balances of each of China and Japan. Back in March, the House held a hearing on the role of foreign government investment in the U.S. economy and financial sector. More along these lines is needed.

My guess is that our equity markets will not find a firm bottom until cross-border government-level deals are struck to convert from debt to equity significant portions of the U.S. dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves sitting overseas in Asia. How about a trillion dollar swap out of Treasuries and into a broad-based equity index like the S&P 500?

A substantial increase in foreign ownership of the American economy is probably a lot closer than we think.

Potential secret weapon to battle our financial crisis: A trillion dollar debt-to-equity swap

While heavily indebted American consumers struggle to make mortgage and credit card payments, a larger shift is underway. News from Tokyo indicates that politicians in Japan, America's "friendly" creditor nation, are beginning to consider investing the country's massive horde of foreign reserves, to "take advantage of the opportunities opening up around the world" during this global financial crisis we are in.

The largest foreign exchange reserves are held by China with $1.9 trillion and Japan with $1.0 trillion, followed by Eurozone countries and Russia, each with about $550 billion. Almost all of these largely U.S. dollar-denominated reserves are invested in conservative fixed-income instruments like U.S. Treasury bonds. However, as noted already in a 2005 article by Andrew Rozonov, who first used the term "sovereign wealth fund," the practical distinction between foreign exchange reserves and their more equity-like sovereign wealth fund counterpart has begun to blur.

In the earlier part of the subprime crisis, we saw high-profile investing of $21 billion by sovereign wealth funds (Singapore, Kuwait and South Korea) into U.S. financial institutions (Citi and Merrill). This week's closing of Mitsubishi UFJ's $9 billion capital infusion into Morgan Stanley is a private sector version of the same type of foreign investment. Given the, not billion, but trillion dollar scale of the foreign exchange reserves that China and Japan have amassed, any decision on their part to swap even a small portion of their fixed-income funds into equity-like investments will have a tremendous impact on the U.S. equity market.

Ponder this: The investments last January by smaller sovereign wealth funds in U.S. financial institutions helped to boost capital, but nevertheless Merrill is now being acquired by Bank of America and Citi's balance sheet is still under pressure. The U.S. government coordinated JPMorgan's acquisition of faltering Bear Stearns in March, but that did not prevent Lehman from going bankrupt in September. After an unprecedented $85 billion government lifeline to AIG last month, AIG needed another $38 billion just last week. Also, despite heightened government intervention in recent weeks--Paulson's $700 billion bank rescue plan signed into law on October 3, coordinated global rate cuts by many G-7 members and other countries last week, and the government's "no objections allowed" infusion of $125 billion capital into JPMorgan, Bank of America, Citi, Wells Fargo, Goldman, Morgan Stanley and other financial institutions announced on Monday--the economic outlook grows bleaker, people worry more about their jobs and retirement and cut back on consumption, and the stock market resumes its downward spiral while real estate prices sag further.

In short, each and every policy measure to date, however unprecedented and seemingly "radical" at implementation, has failed to stem the economic bleeding.

So, where do we turn at this juncture? Well, recall the proverbial "rich uncle," who is perennially forthcoming with money gifts when you are a kid, lends you the extra money you need for a down payment when buying your first house, and provides half the capital you need to start a new business. As our financial crisis runs its course, we Americans as owners of over-leveraged assets in our increasingly distressed U.S. economy really have only one place to go for the capital we so badly need. Because there is not enough capital internally within our national borders, the much-needed equity capital to stabilize our economy and restore confidence of consumers and among financial institutions must come from abroad.

Like it or not, for equity capital rather than just debt, American financial institutions, large corporations and our U.S. equity markets as a whole need to tap into the trillions of dollars of foreign exchange reserves on the books of governments throughout the world, and particularly the trillion dollar balances of each of China and Japan. Back in March, the House held a hearing on the role of foreign government investment in the U.S. economy and financial sector. More along these lines is needed.

My guess is that our equity markets will not find a firm bottom until cross-border government-level deals are struck to convert from debt to equity significant portions of the U.S. dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves sitting overseas in Asia. How about a trillion dollar swap out of Treasuries and into a broad-based equity index like the S&P 500?

A substantial increase in foreign ownership of the American economy is probably a lot closer than we think.